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h i g h l i g h t s
• This paper aims to assess how changes in ethnic/racial tension (over time) affect economic growth in the short-run.
• Time-varying index of ethnic/racial tension.
• Results show that racial tension has detrimental effects on growth, and those effects are more pronounced during low growth periods.
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a b s t r a c t
While many studies stressed the importance of ethnic fractionalization on long-term economic growth,
neither ethnic fractionalization always leads to ethnic conflict nor the intensity of conflict is constant over
time. To address this potential bias, we construct an ethnic/racial tension index by using the number of
US news articles that contain certain keywords. Utilizing this index we test the predictions of a simple
theoretical model in a Markov Switching framework which allows to identify the impact of ethnic/racial
tension in different states of the economy. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, results show that
the magnitude of the impact of ethnic/racial tension is larger during low-growth periods.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Many previous studies argue that ethnic fractionalization may
affect long-term growth through various channels. Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2005) suggest that rent-seeking behavior of
various ethnic groups causes reduced investment, as well as
an increase in public consumption. Alesina et al. (1999) on the
other hand show that ethnic heterogeneity leads to a decline
in the production of public goods. Another strand of literature
contend that ethnic fractionalization may result with low quality
∗ Correspondence to: Economics and Finance, Brunel University London,
Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK. Fax: +44 0 1895 269770.
E-mail address: nicola.spagnolo@brunel.ac.uk (N. Spagnolo).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.015
0165-1765/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articof institutions (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Keefer and Knack, 2002;
Easterly et al., 2006).
One common feature of the aforementioned studies is the
fact that they all proxy ethnic tension with either ethnic
fractionalization, or ethnic polarization. By doing so, they assume
that ethnic tension is a time-invariant variable, and ignore the
possibility that ethnic tension can change over time. Collier (2000)
on the other hand, suggests that ethnic polarization itself does not
lead to conflict. Caselli and Coleman (2013) point out that ethnic
conflict is by no means universal across ethnically heterogeneous
societies: in many countries, ethnic groups coexist peacefully and
the level of conflict is not constant over time.1
1 Esteban and Ray (2011) explain these cross-country differences with the role of
income inequality.
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tension (over time) affect economic growth in the short-run. We
start our investigationwith a basic theoretical model à la Benhabib
and Rustichini (1996), which predicts that the magnitude of the
effect of ethnic/racial tension should be larger during low growth
periods. Then, we construct an index of ethnic/racial tension by
counting the number of articles published in themajor newspapers
in the United States that use certain keywords, and then find
the percentage of news with negative connotation race-related
articles in all race related stories. To our knowledge, ours is the first
paper that constructs a time-varying index of ethnic/racial tension.
Finally,we test ourmodel’s predictionswithin aMarkov-Switching
framework. Our results provide empirical evidence in favor of our
theoretical model’s predictions.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes
the theoretical model of social conflict and its results. Section 3
outlines the econometric model, describes the data and presents
the empirical findings. Section 4 summarizes and offers some
concluding remarks.
2. Theoretical foundation
In this section, we provide a parsimonious version of the
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) model to study the effects of
social conflict on economic growth. The social conflict concept in
the model can refer to competition for resources among groups
divided along any possibly differentiating dimension, such as
ethnic, racial, religious, or political. In this paper we concern
ourselves with ethnic/racial division, hence the social groups in
the model correspond to the ethnic/racial groups we study in the
empirical part.
Model society is made up of two social groups. These groups
consume out of the aggregate output. As a proxy for the
redistributive and expropriative activities of social groups, social
conflict is represented as the possibility of appropriating resources
for one’s benefit, instead of cooperating for the social good. Model
shows that the decision to cooperate or appropriate will depend
on the level of wealth. Appropriation in the current period leads
to retaliation in the next period and a total depletion of the capital
stock. Hence, in highwealth periods players are less likely to defect
since they have more to lose.
Two players in this appropriation game (i = 1, 2) can consume
(ci) out of the common resource pool (f (k) where k is the capital
stock) without an exogenous limit. Since the total demands of the




c1 if c1 + c2 ≤ f (k) or c1 ≤ f (k)/2
f (k) − c2 if c1 + c2 ≥ f (k) and c1 ≥ f (k)/2 ≥ c2
f (k)/2 if c1, c2 ≥ f (k)/2
(1)
with a similar allocation rule A2(.) for group 2. It is possible that
groups choose to appropriate as much as they can, which is called
fast consumption strategies (c̄1(k) = c̄2(k) = f (k)), and deplete all
output in one period. This will be a subgame-perfect equilibrium
(SPE) and will constitute the punishment after a defection from




β tUi(Ai(c̄1(kt), c̄2(kt), kt)) = U(f (k0/2)), (2)
where β is the discount factor, k0 is the initial capital stock
and Ui is the instantaneous utility function for both players.




β tUi(c it) ≥ vDi (k0). (3)
We also define the first-best (FBE) and second-best equilibria
(SBE) in order to characterize the growth paths of the model
economy. While a FBE requires the discounted utility of each
player, vFB(k), to satisfy
vFB(k) = max
c≤f (k)/2
U(c) + βvFB(f (k) − c), (4)
a SBE satisfies a similar equation
vSB(k) = max
c≤f (k)/2
U(c) + βvSB(f (k) − c), (5)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint, vSB(k) ≥ vD(k).
If the FBE satisfies this constraint, it would be the equilibrium of
the model. Otherwise, the SBE would be obtained where vSB(k) =
vD(k). Consumption levels and the growth path would be obtained
accordingly.
As explained above, the possibility of a first-best equilibrium
may depend on the level of wealth. Following Benhabib and
Rustichini (1996), we use the following production and preference
structure to illustrate the case where first-best growth rates
are sustainable only at high levels of wealth and social conflict




Ak if k ≤ 1
A + B(k − 1) if k ≥ 1, B/2 < 1 (6)
with A = 5/2 and β = 1/2. The utility function is
U(c) =

c if c ≤ 1
1 + b(c − 1) if c ≥ 1 (7)
where we assume b is small: Bβ < b < Aβ/2 < 1. Given
Aβ > 1 > bβ, k∗ = 1 and c∗ = 3/4 are the steady-state capital
stock and consumption levels for the optimal growth problem.We
focus on the region k ∈ [0.905, 1] where the economy converges
to its steady state with positive growth.2 Relative to the first-
best equilibrium (k ∈ [0.933, 1] and growth rate is 7.14%) where
there is no social conflict, we can characterize two distinct phases:
low-wealth/high-conflict and high-wealth/low-conflict phases. In
both, first-best growth rates are not attainable since the incentive
constraints bind. However, in the former one, the growth rate is
lowered to near zero levels, whereas in the latter one, the growth
rate declines to 2.9%. The Table 1 illustrates the phases and the
growth rates of the economy in each phase.
The results show that the social conflict tends to have a
bigger negative impact on the growth rate as the wealth level
declines. The intuition is that high wealth levels imply a high cost
of defection and makes appropriation less attractive to players.
However, the consumption is low (and marginal utility is high) at
low wealth levels, therefore consumption rates must be increased
and saving/capital accumulation rates declined to avoid defection.
2 For even lower levels of wealth, i.e. k < 0.905, model economy has negative
or zero growth as noncooperative strategies dominate. Even though this is in line
with our results that social conflict hurts the economy disproportionately at lower
levels of wealth, it is an extreme scenario for developed economies and hence left
out the discussion.
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Growth phases of the model economy and empirical results.
k0 region Growth rate
Low-wealth/high-conflict phase [0.905, 0.907] 0.18





Economic growth 0.170 0.636 −1.738 12.251 241.01
Ethnic/racial tension
index
0.406 0.118 −0.777 3.967 43.35
Markov switching state dimension: Hansen test*
Standardized LR test One vs. two-states Two vs. three-states
4.886 0.319
M = 0 (0.002) (0.601)
M = 1 (0.003) (0.699)
M = 2 (0.005) (0.715)
M = 3 (0.009) (0.779)
M = 4 (0.012) (0.821)
Maximum likelihood estimation results**



















LB(5) 6.883 LB2(5) 9.412
Note:
* The Hansen’s standardized Likelihood Ratio test p-values are calculated
according to the method described in Hansen (1992), using 1000 random draws
from the relevant limiting Gaussian processes and bandwidth parameter M =
0, 1 . . . , 4. Test results for the presence of a third state are also reported.
** Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported
in brackets. LB(5) and LB2(5) are respectively the Ljung and Box (1978) of significance
of autocorrelations of five lags in the standardized and standardized squared
residuals, standard errors are reported in brackets.
3. The econometric model
The regime-switching model Hamilton (1990) considered in
this paper allows for periods of high economic growth and low
economic growth, and is given by:




µ(i)1{st = i}, (t ∈ T) (8)
where yt = (growtht) and xt = (ethnic − tensiont). Given that
st is unobserved, estimation of (8) requires restrictions on the
probability process governing st ; it is assumed that st follows a
first-order, homogeneous, two-state Markov chain. This means
that any persistence in the state is completely summarized by the
value of the state in the previous period. Therefore, the regime
indicators {st} are assumed to form a Markov chain on S with
transition probability matrix P′ = [pij]2×2, where pij = Pr(st =
j|st−1 = i), i, j ∈ S, and pi1 = 1 − pi2 (i ∈ S). Each column sums
to unity and all elements are non-negative. It is also assumed that
{εt} and {st} are independent. Also, note that the independence
between the sequences {εt} and {st} implies that regime changes
take place independently of the past history of {yt}.
Furthermore, we control for monetary policy including in
the conditional mean Eq. (8) the mutual fund rate, zt =Fig. 1. Real economic growth and ethnic/racial tension index. Note: Real economic
growth is proxied by change in industrial production. All news stories that included
the words ‘‘African–American’’, ‘‘Hispanic’’ and ‘‘Race’’, which are race-related
but not with a negative connotation, were counted. Then the number of stories
that included the previous three words as well as negative connotation words
‘‘Crime, Discrimination, Illegal Immigration, Hate, Race, Tension and Violence’’
were counted. The ratio of latter to former is the ethnic/racial tension index. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
(mutual fundt).3 Therefore, the parameters vector of the mean
Eq. (1) is defined by: µ(i) (i = l, h) which are real constants; γ =
γ l, γ h

and θ measure the impact of ethnic tension and interest
rate, respectively. The parameter vector is estimated by maximum
likelihood. The density of the data has two components, one for
each regime, and the log-likelihood function is constructed as a
probability weighted sum of these two components.
4. Empirical results
Monthly data for real economic growth (proxied by change
in industrial production), short term interest rates and ethnic
tension index over the period 1990:1–2015:5 (for a total of
305 observations) for the USA are employed. All economic data
are from International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS). Data used for constructing the ethnic tension
index are collected from Bloomberg. We first counted all news
stories that included the words ‘‘African–American’’, ‘‘Hispanic’’
and ‘‘Race’’, which are race-related but not with a negative
connotation. Then we counted the number of stories that included
the previous three words as well as negative connotation words
3 The literature on economic growth determinants has suggested a wide number
of potential variables. Our approach was to compromise between a model
reasonably parsimonious, in terms of number of variables used, and yet consistent
with the relevant literature. Therefore, mutual fund rate was preferred.
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and Violence’’. The ratio of latter to former is our ethnic/racial
tension index and it is represented by the blue line in Fig. 1.4 The
share of negative news are particularly high after 2012 with the
Trayvon Martin shooting (Feb 2, 2012), President Obama winning
a second term in White House (Nov 6, 2012) and racially charged
US presidential campaigns in 2015.
The null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of
Markov regime switching cannot be tested directly using a
standard likelihood ratio (LR) test. We properly test for multiple
equilibria (more than one regime) against linearity using the
Hansen’s standardized likelihood ratio test (1992). The value of
the standardized likelihood ratio statistics and related p-values
(Table 1) under the null hypothesis (see Hansen, 1992, for details)
provides strong evidence in favor of a two states Markov mean
regime-switching specification.
Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates are also reported in
Table 1. The filter identifies two regimes associated to negative
(−1.416) and positive (0.361) economic growth. The model
appears to be well identified, parameters are significant and the
standardized residuals exhibit no signs of linear or nonlinear
dependence (Ljung–Box statistics for dependency in the first
and second moment). The transition probabilities show a high
persistency of the high state (q = 0.993) whereas periods
of economic depression are less persistent (p = 0.797) and
expected to last shorter (duration = 4.5 months) In deriving
the results, mainly two hypotheses are investigated: the effect
of ethnic tension in periods of (i) low growth






γ h = 0

. From the results reported in Table 1
the following points are noteworthy. We observe a negative and
significant effect running from ethnic tension index into economic
growth. The effect is larger (smaller), in absolute value, in the cases
of low (higher) growth with values equal to −5.591 and −0.195,
respectively. The impact of ethnic tension related news when the
economy is experiencing low economic growth is sensibly bigger
(about twenty five times) than in the presence of high economic
growth. Finally, the control variable considered is statistically
significant and in linewith our prior showing negative interest rate
(θ = −0.028) effects.
4 Note that in all periods of our sample there is at least one race-related story. So
when our index is equal to 0, it means there are some race-related news, but none
of them include negative connotation keywords.5. Conclusions
This paper analyzed how ethnic/racial tension as a time varying
concept affects economic growth in the short-run. Consistent with
our theoretical model, our empirical investigation that uses a
novel measure of ethnic/racial tension shows that racial tension
has detrimental effects on growth, and those effects are more
pronounced during low growth periods.
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